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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term
By RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT L. WORTHINGTON,
DAVID BUCHANAN
I. Introduction
This Study, twelfth in a series,1 tabulates and analyzes the voting be-
havior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1996 Term. 2 The
analysis is designed to identify whether an individual Justice, as well as the
Court as a whole, is voting more "conservatively," more "liberally," or
about the same when compared with past Terms. As with political analy-
sis, the identification of judicial trends is inherently difficult. Whether a
particular voting pattern is "conservative" or "liberal" often lies in the eye
of the beholder. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Christian
Coalition could, for example, attach different sematic interpretations to the
same behavior.
This Study attempts to remove such subjectivity by applying a con-
sistent classification scheme to defined categories of cases across time:
"conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of governmental
power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a claim of individual lib-
erty.3 By tracking the Term-to-Term "conservative" or "liberal" changes in
" Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
J.D. candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986
Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued this Study in Su-
preme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 Study].
The last three studies, analyzing the 1993, 1994, and 1995 terms, were published in the
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 1993 term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study];
Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 term, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Be-
havior: 1995 term, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study].
2. The 1996 Term includes decisions made between October 1996 and July 1997.
3. There is no single, settled definition of "conservatism" or "liberalism." See generally
M.A. RiFF, DICrIoNARY OF MODERN POLmCAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-152 (1987) (discussing
possible definitions). The Study's definitions, however, are close to the core ideals of each ideol-
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the voting patterns of individual Justices (and the Court) across ten defined
categories of cases,4 and by applying standard statistical tests to the re-
suiting data,5 this Study attempts to give reliable information regarding the
current ideological posture of the Court and its personnel. Whether any
statistical study of a process as complex as judicial decision making can
ever be reliable, of course, is open to debate.6 But within the innate limi-
tations of an attempt to "number crunch" ideology, this annual survey can
be a useful tool to anticipate the Court's or a Justice's likely decision in a
particular case.
This Term's survey suggests continued (if somewhat uneasy) conser-
vatism on the High Court. Only one table, focusing on cases involving
statutory civil rights,7 unquestionably showed increased liberal receptivity
in this Term. On virtually every other measure, the Court is more conser-
vative in 1996 than in 1995, voting more often in favor of the states and
federal government,8 against First Amendment and equal protection
claims, 9 and against the expansion of federal jurisdiction.10 Whether this
trend will continue, however, is uncertain. The uneasy hegemony of con-
servative coalitions over liberal coalitions that prevailed this Term in im-
portant five-to-four decisions suggests that the replacement of even a sin-
gle Justice could have a significant impact on the Court's future
ideological course. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, as demonstrated by
Data Table 10, set the present ideological tenor of the Court. The re-
placement of either Justice or the resignation of any one of the Court's
conservative core, the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, could
significantly alter the ideological makeup of the Court.
ogy. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect
for established institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies and a general mistrust of
theory as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth cen-
tury" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certain of a belief in
the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain of a desire to restrict government intervention in
most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. See infra note 42.
7. See infra Data Table 7.
8. See infra Data Tables 1-4. The voting data involving federal civil cases, Data Table 2,
is somewhat inconclusive. Although the Court decreased somewhat its support for the federal
government in "Majority All Cases" (a "liberal" result), it increased its support in "Split Deci-
sions" (a "conservative" result). Because the outcome of "Split Decisions" is more indicative of
actual ideology than the outcome of unanimous cases (which are included in the "Majority All
Cases" tabulation), Table 2 most likely indicates (if anything) conservative movement. Further-
more, "Category Analysis," performed for the first time this year, see infra Appendix B, suggests
that Table 2 provides less reliable data than other indicators contained in this Study. See infra
Part V.
9. See infra Data Tables 5 and 6.
10. See infra Data Tables 8 and 9.
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The predictive and descriptive statistics contained in this year's Study
demonstrate a few other interesting results. For the past several years, we
have projected anticipated future voting patterns for various Justices. This
Term, that effort produced reliable results in only two areas: (1) the 1995
Study rather accurately predicted voting outcomes for five Justices in fed-
eralism cases;1" and (2) that Study also closely predicted Justice Stevens'
voting behavior in five categories-federal civil,1 2 state criminal,13 statu-
tory civil rights,14 federal jurisdiction,15 and federalism.16  Also, for the
first time, we have conducted "Category" and "Frontier" analyses.
17
"Category Analysis" suggests that five of the Study's nine topical catego-
ries-statutory civil rights,18 state criminal cases,
19 federal jurisdiction,20
federalism, 21 and state civil cases--more accurately account for "liberal"
versus "conservative" outcomes than the remaining categories. "Frontier
Analysis" demonstrates that Justice Stevens marks the outer boundaries of
liberalism on the Court, while the Chief Justice marks the outer boundaries
of the Court's conservatism.
This Study is divided into sections to make it more accessible to the
user. The precise details of the statistical analysis-as can be gleaned
from a glance at the equations (and explanations) in Appendix B-are
hardly the stuff of light cocktail conversations. But one need not have an
advanced degree in mathematics to understand the general trends that flow
from the Study's analysis. Accordingly, this Study meets the needs of the
reader who simply wants the gist of identifiable ideological trends as well
as the reader who wants to probe the details of our statistical examinations.
Part II gives a description of the mode of analysis employed. Part I fol-
lows with a general overview of the findings of the Study. Part IV sets out
the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and discusses-
table-by-table and chart-by-chart-the information contained on them.
Parts V and VI describe the methodology (and outcome) of this year's
"Category" and "Frontier" Analyses. Appendices A and B detail the defi-
nitions and statistical tests that govern this Study.
11. See infra Data Table 9.
12. See infra Data Table 2.
13. See infra Data Table 3.
14. See infra Data Table 7.
15. See infra Data Table 8.
16. See infra Data Table 9.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See infra Data Table 7.
19. See infra Data Table 3.
20. See infra Data Table 8.
21. See infra Data Table 9.
22. See infra Data Table 1.
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H. Mode of Analysis
The Study is based upon the tabulation and mathematical analysis of
each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues (for example, First Amendment, equal
protection) or on the character of the parties (for example, state or federal
government litigants) 23 The tenth category tabulates the number of times
each Justice voted with the majority in cases decided by a single, or swing,
vote.24
These categories are designed to demonstrate each Justice's attitude
toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court decision making:
protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The tabulation of
votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the frequency with which
individual Justices and the Court as a whole vote to protect individual
rights25 or exercise judicial restraint.26 From the voting patterns that
emerge, this Study determines whether individual Justices and the Court
are taking "conservative" or "liberal" positions.27 This Study classifies
23. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state, or one of its offi-
cials or political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in which the
federal government, or one of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party; (3) state
criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of freedom (speech, press,
and association); (6) equal protection claims; (7) statutory civil rights claims; (8) issues of federal
court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
24. See infra Data Table 10.
25. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of state
and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolution of
claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil
rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also involve individual
rights, since these suits pit the government against persons asserting private rights. The federal-
ism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual rights because such
decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the
practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to a party alleging state encroach-
ment upon his or her rights.
26. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Justices to
avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial restraint.
Other Tables included in this Study, however, also provide some indication of the individual Jus-
tices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial re-
straint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches of government, adher-
ence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist,
respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues ren-
dered unnecessary by ripeness, mootness, political question, and other similar doctrines. As a
result, a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indica-
tion of "judicial activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the
Court to overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also
relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states
within the federal system.
27. The authors are mindful of the limited validity of the "conservative" and "liberal" labels
given the potential for semantic misinterpretaion. See RIFF, supra note 3.
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outcomes that favor an assertion of governmental power as conservative,
and outcomes that favor a claim of individual right as liberal. Accordingly,
a vote for the government against an individual, a vote against a claim of
constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction,
or a vote favoring state (as opposed to federal) authority on federalism
questions is classified as conservative. All contrary votes are classified as
liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions (a sig-
nificant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are included in this
Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative ideology may not
have influenced the outcome of such cases. When an opinion is unani-
mous, it is often true that either the law or the facts, or both, pointed so
clearly in one direction that ideology was not a decisional factor. Further-
more, concern for individual rights is not necessarily the attitudinal oppo-
site of judicial restraint. This Term, for example, the Court's disposition
of City of Boerne v. Flores? reigned in the free exercise protection re-
cently extended to individuals by Congress under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),29 while at the same time broadly assert-
ing the Court's supremacy in "say[ing] what the law is."
30
Despite these difficulties, the basic assumption that supports this
Study-that the general orientation of individual Justices and the Court to
individual rights and judicial restraint is suggestive of conservative or lib-
eral ideology-appears sound.31  For example, deference to legislatures
frequently results in rejection of an individual's claim, especially one
predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action.32 Such judicial
restraint is associated with a reluctance to read new rights into the Consti-
28. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The Court reasserted its holding in Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith: Government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct... cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a relig-
ious objector's spiritual development. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). Congress enacted RFRA to
restore the pre-Smith balancing test requirement, set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, under which the
Court would determine whether a law substantially burdened a religious practice, and, if so,
whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Boerne Court stated that
"courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has
exceeded its authority under the Constitution." 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
31. See RIFF, supra note 3; see discussion infra Part V.
32. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (holding that individual members of
Congress failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient to establish Article II standing in an action
challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
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tution or a statute.33 Further, refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves
the matter to state courts with their possible bias in favor of state govern-
mental action and constitutes a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal
protection of rights.34 Therefore, to the extent that this Study's basic
ideological assumptions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes are
accurate, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the voting patterns re-
flected in Data Tables 1 through 10.
To ascertain current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other Justices
this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1986 through 1995 Terms.
The current ideological position of the Court as a whole can be determined
by comparing present outcomes for the Court majority with those of prior
Terms. In Data Tables 1-10 this information appears in the form of per-
centages for each Justice and for the Court majority.35 Charts 1 through
10, in turn, graphically demonstrate the Court's voting trends revealed in
the tables.36
Mean Tables 1 through 10 and Regression Tables 1 through 10 ana-
lyze the voting patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these
tables is to determine whether a Justice's 1996 Term voting record departs
in a statistically significant manner from prior voting behavior and whether
any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-Term voting patterns
of the Justices.37 Frontier Analysis Tables 1 through 4 and Frontier Charts
1 through 4 compare the Justice's conservative and liberal predilections
this Term and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis38 miti-
gates some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed39 by measur-
ing the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the Court
rather than against an absolute scale.
All of this data must be interpreted with caution. Both the nature of
the decided cases each term and a Justice's individual behavior affect the
percentages and statistical results revealed in each table. The increase in
the Court's receptivity to the federal government's claims during the 1995
33. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997) (holding that Title IV-D does not
give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with its provi-
sions).
34. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2043 (1997) ("The
dignity and status of its statehood allows Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and
to insist upon responding to these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and determine
the case.").
35. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
36. See infra Appendix B.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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and 1996 Terms,40 for example, may be more reflective of the increasing
care and selectivity exercised by the federal government in pressing only
meritorious claims upon the Court than of growing conservatism.4' Fur-
thermore, Supreme Court cases are not the result of random selection, and
the universe of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since both
random sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of any fully
reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study are not be-
yond dispute. There are obvious limitations in any empirical analysis of a
subjective decision making process.42
Despite these caveats, this study is both worth conducting and read-
ing. For years, experienced Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to
divine the ideological predilections of individual Justices in framing their
arguments to the Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians are
fond of attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel. Su-
preme Court practitioners, legal scholars, and the public have long as-
sumed that assessments of Court ideology are valuable-even though such
assessments may be based upon little more than the gut reactions of the
attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved. This Study, based upon a
systematic methodology for objectively gathering, quantifying, and ana-
lyzing data over time, should be more reliable than such ad hoc assess-
ments.
M. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 1996 Term
The voting behavior of the 1996 Term indicates some consolidation of
the Court's generally conservative stance. While last Term's data sug-
40. See infra Data Table 4.
41. The federal government did not fare well before the Court during the early years of the
Clinton Administration. See 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 31; see also 1995 Study, supra note 1,
at 281-86. Recent terms' significantly improved "batting average" for the Administration may
flow from the Solicitor General's increased experience in selecting "winners" to present to the
Court, rather than growing "conservatism" on the part of the Court.
42. The general reliability of statistical inference depends upon random sampling. See gen-
erally ALLEN T. CRAIG AND ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
157-58 (1995); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN REGRESSION WITH
APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is far from random. Rather,
it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Reliable statistics generally require large quan-
tities of information to produce reliable results. As sample sizes become larger, inferences be-
come more accurate. This Study is limited: the cases in which decisions have been rendered by
the Court during the period for which data have been collected. Sample sizes vary from year to
year, according to the case selection of the Court. This Study, then, is subject to sampling bias,
both because the sample is not random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical in-
ferences generated below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's)
views.
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gested ideological tension (with liberal movement in at least four Tables),43
nine of the ten tables this Term indicate a return to (and possible rein-
forcement of) the conservative voting behaviors evidenced in prior Terms.
The liberal movement in Data Table 7 and the uneasy balance of power in
swing-vote cases in Data Table 10, however, hint that (with one or two re-
placements) the present conservative Court could quickly become much
more liberal.
Data Table 1, gauging the Justices' voting behaviors in civil cases
pitting state government parties against private parties, reveals conserva-
tive ideological movement. Since the 1993 Term, the Court has voted
more often for state government, and therefore more conservatively, in
each of the last four Terms-reaching an all time high score of 72.7% this
year. One explanation for this trend might be that 75% of the uanimous
cases were decided in favor of the state government. However, the Court
also recorded the Study's second highest mark ever in this category for
split decisions (where ideology presumably plays a more important role).
Taken together, the three categories--"Majority All Cases," "Split Deci-
sion," and "Unanimous"--included in Data Table 1 affirm the Court's
conservative posture in state civil actions involving private parties.
This conservative trend continues in Data Table 2 with civil cases in-
volving the federal government. After a four-year liberal trend ending with
the 1994 Term, the last two Terms have revealed high conservative scores
by the Court. This year, although the "Majority All Cases" and "Unani-
mous" categories suggest liberal movement, the outcome in the "Split De-
cisions" category is conservative. Interestingly, Justices Breyer and Souter
take the lead on Data Table 2, voting in favor of the federal government in
73.9% and 69.6% of the cases, respectively. It seems the Court (now
headed up by "liberals" who vote in favor of a "liberal" federal govern-
ment) has returned to its conservative ways, voting as it did prior to the
1990 Term. This trend may continue, especially if Justice Breyer's voting
behavior remains as conservative as it has been the last two Terms.
Data Tables 3 and 4 similarly indicate a slightly conservative jump in
criminal cases involving the state and federal governments, as the Court
voted in favor of the governments 63.6% and 84.6% of the time, respec-
tively. In state criminal cases decided by a split decision this Term, the
Court voted in favor of the state 100% of the time-a strong indication of
conservative voting behavior. In federal criminal cases, 75% of the split
decisions and 100% of the unanimous decisions were decided in favor of
the government. Although unanimous decisions may not reveal much
43. See generally, 1995 Study, supra note 1.
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about the Court's ideological balance, the nevertheless high scores for the
federal government (84.6% overall) evidence a conservative stance.
As for the Court's treatment of substantive claims involving the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Data Tables 5 and 6 again demonstrate rather conservative voting
behaviors. Data Table 5 shows that the Court expressed its lowest support
of First Amendment claims since the 1990 Term, voting in favor of the
claim only 28.6% of the time. Likewise, in cases involving equal protec-
tion claims, the Court voted for the claim only 20% of the time, marking
the Justices' second lowest support for equal protection issues since 1989.
By contrast, Data Table 7 indicates a liberal trend in statutory civil
rights cases. No single Justice voted in favor of a statutory civil rights
claim less than 50% of the time. Data Table 7 is thus the single, consis-
tently liberal indicator in this year's Study. Though isolated, "Category
Analysis" suggests that this statistic is important: Data Table 7 may well
be a harbinger of a liberal court to come.44 The increased receptivity of a
majority of the Court to statutory civil rights claims may be particularly
significant because Data Table 7 this Term is topped by the Court's four
most liberal Justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg).
In cases raising a challenge to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the
Court initially appears to have been rather stagnant. Nevertheless, a
slightly conservative trend might be revealed by Data Table 8. After last
Term's across-the-board liberal movement, the "Majority All Cases" cate-
gory indicates a decline in the Court's willingness to expand the jurisdic-
tional reach of the federal courts. Similarly, in cases decided by a split
vote, only 28% were decided in favor of jurisdiction. Although a some-
what weak indicator of conservatism, this movement suggests that the 1996
Court has not continued any liberal tendencies from the prior Term.
Data Table 9, involving federalism issues, reveals conservative
movement as the Court's support of state claims rises to its highest point
since the 1990 Term. This support for the states in federalism cases is
strong across the board, with only two Justices (Stevens and Souter) voting
for the states less than half of the time.
Finally, Data Table 10, involving cases decided by a single vote, pres-
ents possibly the most interesting statistics. This Data Table again demon-
strates the ideologically divided camps that comprise the Court: a conser-
vative wing, composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, and a liberal wing, composed of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter
and Stevens. Swinging between these two factions are Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, whose votes have a substantial impact on the outcome of the
44. See infra Part V.
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most compelling issues before the Court. For the past four Terms, Justice
Kennedy has "swung" the most, voting most often with the majority in
close cases, followed closely by Justice O'Connor, who has held second
place for the past three Terms.
In 1996, the pattern repeats itself. Data Table 10 indicates moderately
conservative voting behavior, with conservative coalitions controlling
56.3% of the decisions decided by a single vote. This slight edge of con-
servative over liberal coalitions results from the voting patterns of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, who side with the majority coalition 81% and
75% of the time, respectively. Ideologically, as these swingers vote, so
votes the Court.
IV. The 1997 Term Voting Record
This Study seeks to quantify several characteristics of Supreme Court
voting behavior by analyzing the Court's voting record. We examine vot-
ing trends, patterns, and mean voting percentages both for individual Jus-
tices and for the Court as a whole.45 Subpart A below explains, in simple
fashion, the numerical and statistical tests used in this Study and their rep-
resentation in the charts and graphs that follow.46 Subpart B provides a
categorical analysis of significant trends and patterns present in the data.
A. The Data
Data Tables 1 through 10 set out the Term-by-Term voting scores for
each Justice, the breakdown of votes contributing to 1996 Term scores, our
predicted 1996 Term scores, the prediction error, and our predicted scores
for the 1997 Term. Scores are simply the percentage of times a Justice
voted in favor of the party or claim indicated in each table's title. Predic-
tions are based on an ARIMA47 forecasting model. The bottom three rows
of each Data Table contain scores for the Court as a whole and are broken
down into three categories. "Majority All Cases" summarizes the Court's
disposition of all decisions involving the indicated party or claim, while
"Split Decision" and "Unanimous" summarize only those decisions
reached by a divided or unanimous Court respectively.
Charts 1 through 10 display, in graphical form, the Court's voting re-
cord in each category over the course of the Study. The "Majority All
Cases" line reveals trends in the Court's disposition of cases within the in-
45. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or precluded in
some instances due to insufficient data.
46. For additional information regarding our methods. of analysis, see Appendix B.
47. ARIMA stands for AutoRegressive, Integrated Moving-Average. For more information
on this procedure, see Appendix B.
[Vol. 25:35
Fall 1997] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1996 TERMS 45
dicated category from one Term to the next. The "Split Decisions" line is
perhaps more interesting because it includes only those cases in which
Justices disagreed with one another and so may provide a better indication
of the Court's "balance" in each category. The "Unanimous" line rounds
out the information presented by demonstrating the outcome of cases in
which there was no ideological division.
Mean Tables 1 through 10 set out the mean of all scores recorded for
each Justice during the first ten Terms of this Study (1986-1995). Also
shown are the 99% confidence interval for the true mean, the standard de-
viation of the scores, and the 1996 Term scores. The final column indi-
cates whether 1996 Term scores differed in a statistically significant way
from the Justices' past mean scores.
Finally, Regression Tables 1 through 10 show Pearson correlations
and adjusted r2 statistics relating the Justices' Term-to-Term voting pat-
terns. The r2 statistic is a more reliable indicator of correlation than the
Pearson statistic. A high positive correlation between Justices does not in-
dicate that they vote together, but rather that their Term-to-Term scores
tend to move in similar directions. In fact, this statistic may provide more
information regarding the nature of the cases decided each Term than it
does regarding the Court's voting behavior. Although some general indi-
cations of bloc voting behavior might be deduced from this information,
more reliable information can be gleaned from our swing vote analysis
48
and frontier analysis.49 For this reason, we devote only minimal discussion
to the correlation statistic this Term, but continue to include the data in or-
der to maintain consistency with information provided by the Study in
prior Terms.
48. See infra Data Table 10.
49. See infra Part VI. and Appendix B.
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Chart 1
Civil Cases: State Government Versus a Private Party
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REGRESSION TABLE 1
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Correlation (p) / R2 (adjusted)
Justice Breyer Ginsburg Kennedy O'Connor Rehnquist Scalia Souter Stevens Thomas
Breyer
Ginsburg .93/.76
Kennedy .85/.43 iI .
O'Connor .72/.03 .93/85 ' -
Rehnquist .991.96 .781.41 .79/.57
Scalia .97/.83 .83/.53 .73/.47
Souter .951.80 .80/.56 .75/.46 .95/.87
Stevens .96/.85 .99/.96
Thomas 1 .861.661
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Chart 2
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REGRESSION TABLE 2
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Correlation (p)/ RI (adjusted)
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REGRESSION TABLE 3
STATE CRIMINAL CASES
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REGRESSION TABLE 4
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Correlation (p) / R2 (adjusted)
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REGRESSION TABLE 5
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS O EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OFRELlGION
Correlation (p) / R2 (adjusted)
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Chart 6
Equal Protection Claims
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REGRESSION TABLE 7
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMs
Correlation (p) R2 (adjusted)
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Chart 8




1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
- Majority All Cases - Split Decisions ....... Unanimous

















o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:22ZZZ02222
%0 i' n in t " " Cin %0 4
0 zt
cl q~ (n n~ q~0e









S 0'~~ ~ o2
0






Fall 1997] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1996 TERMS 77
REGRESSION TABLE 8
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Correlation (p) / R2 (adjusted)
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REGRESSION TABLE 9
FEDERALISM CASES
Correlation (p) I R2 (adjusted)
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Chart 10
Swing Vote Analysis
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REGRESSION TABLE 10
SWING VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MosT OFTEN WrTH THE MAJORrrY IN CLOSE CASES
Correlation (p) / R (adjusted)
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B. Analysis
Table 1: Civil--State Party
Data Table 1 and Chart 1 indicate a marked increase in the Court's
support of state government in civil cases.50 Although there has been
gradually increasing .support for state governments for the past two Terms,
this year's data reaches new highs in two categories. Both the "Majority
All Cases" and "Unanimous" categories rose to record highs during the
1996 Term, from 52.9% to 72.7% and 16.7% to 75% respectively. The
"Split Decisions" category remained relatively consistent with last Term's
record level, dipping insignificantly from 72.7% to 69.2%. Overall, the
steady incline in favor of state governments spanning the 1993 Term to the
present indicates increasingly conservative voting behavior.
Individually, Chief Justice Rehnquist reemerges as the most conser-
vative Justice in civil cases involving state governments. In 1996, he voted
in favor of state governments 84.9% of the time, his highest score ever by
almost a full percentage point. This is a significant increase compared
with his last year's all-time low score of 43.8%. Justices Thomas and
Scalia tied for second this year with personal all time high scores of
77.4%.51 Justice Kennedy's support of state governments rose from 41.2%
to 71.9%, an increase second only to that of the Chief Justice. The small-
est increase is in the score of Justice Thomas, which only rose 10 points
from 67.4% to 77.4%.
50. Cases decided in favor of state governments: General Motors v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811
(1997); California Div. of Labor v. Dillingham Const., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997); Regents of Univ.
of California v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900 (1997); Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905 (1997); Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169
(1997); Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997); Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997); Edwards
v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997); De-
Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997); Arkansas v. Farm Credit Serv., 117 S. Ct.
1776 (1997); Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865
(1997); Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117
S. Ct. 2028 (1997); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); Lawyer v. Department of Jus-
tice, 117 S. Ct. 2186 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); and Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). Cases decided against state governments: Lopez v. Monterey
County, 117 S. Ct. 340 (1996); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996); Greene v. Georgia, 117
S. Ct. 578 (1996); General Motors v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997); Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct.
1295 (1997); Camp Newfound Inc. v. Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997); Suitim v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997); Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997);
Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997); and Foreman v. Dallas County, 117 S. Ct. 2357
(1997).
51. Justices Thomas and Scalia did not reach the civil-state party issue in DeBuono v.
NYSL, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997). Thus, they addressed one less case than did the Court as a whole
in Data Table 1.
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Statistically predicted voting patterns for 1996 were far too liberal.52
Justice Kennedy, predicted to vote for state governments 34.5% of the
time, instead voted that way 71.9% of the time, a 37-point error. Justice
Stevens' voting behavior was closer to the predicted mark, but even he
voted more often for the states than predicted, siding with the states 48.5%
of the time, rather than the predicted 32.5%. These disparities may be ex-
plained in part by the fact that this Term marked only the second year, in
the eleven years of this Study, that every Justice voted more conservatively
than in the preceding Term.53 Such movement represents a statistically
significant departure from the previous voting means of the Chief Justice
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Stevens and Thomas.
The most notable voting correlations in this category are between
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and between the Chief Justice and Justice
Breyer. Both pairings show adjusted r2 statistics of 96%. This high r2 sta-
tistic indicates that each pair's scores vary from one Term to another in
such a way that the score of one Justice may be predicted with a high de-
gree of accuracy based on the score of the other. Correlation does not,
however, imply causation.
Table 2: Civil-Federal Party
The Court's support of the federal government in civil cases dwindled
slightly this Term.54 The "Majority All Cases" support for the federal gov-
ernment fell about five points, from 75% in 1995 to 69.6%. Likewise, the
outcome in "Unanimous" cases dropped 19 points, from 88.9% in 1995 to
70%. in 1996. But, despite this apparently "liberal" movement, the overall
record is mixed. The Court increased its receptivity to the federal gov-
52. Predictions were made for C.J. Rehnquist, and JJ. Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Stev-
ens for the 1996 Term.
53. The only other year in which this occurred was in the 1989 Term. See e.g., 23
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 9 (1995).
54. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: I.N.S. v. Yang, 117 S. Ct. 350
(1996); O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996); United States v. Jose, 117 S. Ct. 463
(1996); In Re Gaydos, 117 S. Ct. 466 (1996); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., 117 S. Ct.
660 (1997); Atherton v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997); Bibles v. Oregon
Natural Desert Assoc., 117 S. Ct. 795 (1997); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Program, Dept. of Labor, 117 S. Ct. 796 (1997); United States v.
Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997); Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 117 S. Ct. 1953 (1997); Glick-
man v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997); Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2186;
Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2312. Cases decided against the federal government: Babbitt v. Youpee,
117 S. Ct. 727 (1997); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997);
Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124 (1997); Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154
(1997); Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1871 (1997); Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157;
and Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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ernment in split decisions, with the government gaining about five points,
from 63.6% in 1995 to 69.2% in 1996. This data suggests that, in closer
cases, the present Court now votes more often in favor of the federal gov-
ernment-with Justices Breyer and Souter leading the way.
Table 2, in fact, may suggest something of a conservative/liberal "re-
orientation" on the Court. The normally "conservative" Justices Scalia and
Thomas occupy the liberal bottom of Table 2, with the ostensibly more
"liberal" Justices Breyer and Souter holding the conservative top. Moreo-
ver, except for the interposition of the Chief Justice at position number
three, the top five spots on Table 2 are held by the Court's politically lib-
eral wing-Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. The scores of
Justices Scalia, Stevens and Thomas all dropped sufficiently compared
with their previous mean scores, to register a statistically significant differ-
ence. This data may suggest that politically liberal Justices are now cast-
ing "conservative" votes in favor of a politically liberal administration.
The predictions made for the 1996 Term were extremely accurate for
Justices Stevens and Scalia, missing by only 0.2 and 3.3 points respec-
tively. The statistical prediction for Justice O'Connor was the most inac-
curate. She voted 37.5 points more often in favor of the government than
her prior behavior predicted. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg have highly
correlated voting patterns in this category with an adjusted r2 statistic of
97%. No other correlations are particularly noteworthy.
Table 3: State Criminal Cases
The support for states in criminal cases increased by the largest mar-
gin since the 1992 Term, rising from 55.6% to 63.6%, as shown in Data
Table 3 and Chart 3.55 However, even more ideologically significant is the
score in the "Split Decision" category. Of the five cases decided by a split
vote, all five were decided in favor of the states. Since the 1994 Term, the
Court's support of the state governments has steadily increased in the
"Split Decision" category from 61.5% to its all-time high of 100% this
Term. Only in "Unanimous" cases did the Court's support of the states
wane, dropping from 40% in 1995 to 33.3% in 1996. Taken as a whole,
however, Data Table 3 evidences (if anything) continued conservative be-
havior.
55. Cases decided in favor of the states: California v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996); Ohio v.
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996); Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); Richards v. Wis-
consin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997); Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517 (1997); O'Dell v. Neth-
erland, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997); and Pounders v. Watson, 117 S. Ct. 2359 (1997). Cases decided
against the states: Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997); Young v. Harper, 117 S. Ct. 1148
(1997); Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1416; and Bracy v. Granmley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997).
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The Court's traditional conservatism on state criminal issues may be
tempering somewhat. Individually, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas recorded their lowest scores thus far, both voting in favor of state
governments only 63.6% of the time. Similarly, Justice Kennedy recorded
his second lowest score of 54.6%. Nevertheless, the overall trend in the
data this Term is conservative. Six of nine Justices voted for the state
more often than in the 1995 Term, and the three who voted less often for
the state (Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Stevens) did so by narrow mar-
gins, with the most pronounced decrease in state support being the four-
point drop by Justice Stevens. The scores of the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, while high compared to the other Justices,
nevertheless dropped by a statistically significant amount when compared
with their previous mean scores in this category.
As predicted, Justice Stevens continued to vote consistently in this
category. His behavior varied from his predicted score by only 1.6 points.
The prediction for Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, was the
most inaccurate, as his past behavior suggested he would vote 27.2 points
more often for the states than he actually did. But, despite this error, the
Chief Justice tied with three other Justices for the high score, voting 63.6%
of the time in favor of the government. No correlations among the Justices
scores were particularly strong in this category.
Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Data Table 4 and Figure 4 demonstrate the Court's continuing strong
support for the federal government in criminal cases.56 In the "Majority
All Cases" category, the Court voted for the government 84.6% of the
time, the highest score in the last eight Terms. While governmental sup-
port in the "Split Decisions" category fell from 85.7% to 75%, it was
countered by 100% support for the government in "Unanimous" cases.
Moreover, four Justices recorded their highest scores ever, with Justices
Scalia and O'Connor leading the way by voting for the federal government
92.3% of the time. As with the 1995 Term, this Term's results were also
56. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct.
633 (1997); United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997); United States v. Gonzales, 117 S. Ct.
1032 (1997); United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997); Johnson v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 1544 (1997); Edmond v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997); United States v. Hyde, 117 S.
Ct. 1630 (1997); United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997); and United States v.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). Cases decided against the federal government: Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997); and Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
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notable for their uniformity, with four Justices voting for the federal gov-
ernment in 84.6% of criminal cases.57
Individually, Justice O'Connor's score showed a marked increase
from past Terms. Her support of the federal government, in 92.3% of fed-
eral criminal cases, rose nearly 21 points, the most dramatic movement of
the Term in this category. By contrast, Justice Stevens' voting behavior
remained the most liberal, as it has for the past six years. He voted for the
government only 53.8% of the time. Nevertheless, and for the first time in
six years, Justice Stevens voted for the federal government in criminal
cases over 50% of the time.
Overall, individual Justices voted more conservatively than their past
term behavior would indicate. Indeed, the Court as a whole has not voted
for the government this often since the 1988 Term. The scores of Justices
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist each
shifted to a more conservative position by a statistically significant degree
when compared with their prior mean scores. Justices Souter and Gins-
berg's voting patterns correlate to a high degree in this category, with an
adjusted r2 statistic of 99% and identical scores for the 1993 and 1994
Terms. In 1995 and 1996, their scores continued to move substantially in
tandem, although Justice Souter voted somewhat more conservatively than
did Justice Ginsburg.
Table 5: Fiist Amendment
Data Table 5 and Chart 5 demonstrate a dramatic conservative ideo-
logical shift in the area of First Amendment claims.58 In the "Majority All
Cases" category, the Court voted for the claim only 28.6% of the time, a
conservative shift of 46.4 points from the previous Term. The "Split Deci-
sion" category mirrored this shift, favoring First Amendment claims only
28.6% of the time. This score, the lowest in this category during the last
six Terms, is significant. All First Amendment claims this year were de-
cided by split decisions, and the governing majorities appeared somewhat
hostile to First Amendment claims.
This apparent "hostility" to the First Amendment in 1996 might be
due to the competing ideological interests involved in three cases this
57. These four Justices included the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Souter and Ken-
nedy.
58. Cases decided in favor of the First Amendment claim: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
of Western N.Y., 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Cases decided
against the First Amendment claim: Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 855; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 117 S.
Ct. at 1174; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997).
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Term. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,59 involving the consti-
tutional propriety of government regulations that required cable broadcast-
ers to carry certain local television stations, 60 displayed an unusual voting
alignment. Generally conservative Justices (Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor, joined by Justice Ginsburg) supported the First Amendment
claim, while more traditionally liberal jurists (Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
joined by Kennedy and the Chief Justice) turned their back on free speech.
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers,61 involving the constitutional validity of
"generic" fruit advertising supported by compelled government assess-
ments, similarly pitted First Amendment values against the perceived de-
mands of the modern administrative state-with the Court's more liberal
members rejecting the constitutional claim.62 Schenk v. Pro-Choice Net-
work,63 meanwhile, forced a choice between free speech and abortion
rights, with the free speech interest prevailing only partially.64 In each of
these cases, traditionally liberal jurists may have been more responsive to
the perceived need for government regulation rather than free speech,
while the very existence of government regulation impelled the tradition-
ally conservative judges to embrace First Amendment values. If so, the
ideological guidance provided by Table 5 this Term is obscure at best.
Whatever subjective analysis might suggest, Table 5 demonstrates
that the First Amendment faired poorly in 1996. Every Justice supported
fewer First Amendment claims, with the exception of Justices Thomas and
Scalia-who uncharacteristically topped the chart by supporting First
Amendment claims 85.7% of the time. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor both lowered their support for First Amendment claims some 34
points, favoring the claim only 28.6% of the time. The Chief Justice's
score, however, is consistent with his position as the most conservative
Justice in First Amendment cases during eight of the last ten Terms.
At bottom, the conservative swing of the Court on First Amendment
issues is explained by the low scores of normally supportive Justices. Jus-
59. 117 S.Ct. 1174.
60. See id.
61. 117 S. Ct. 2130.
62. The majority was comprised of Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Stevens and
O'Connor.
63. 117 S. Ct. 855.
64. See id. at 866-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg) (addressing the propriety of "floating" and "fixed" buffer zones
which limit the activities of abortion protestors, and finding that "floating" buffer zones violate
the First Amendment); see id. at 868-71 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.) (finding that "fixed" buffer zones do not violate the First Amendment);
and see id at 874-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, Thomas, J.J.) (arguing that
Court's action sustaining "fixed" buffer zones "makes a destructive inroad upon First Amend-
ment law").
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tice Breyer, for example, voted the most conservatively, voting for the
claim only 14.3% of the time, which marked an all-time low score for him.
In fact, his score dropped 61 points from the previous Term. Whether the
Court's unusual hostility to the First Amendment this Term is an aberra-
tion, best explained by the ideological cross currents discussed above, re-
mains to be seen.
The Court's unprecedented 47-point decrease in its support of First
Amendment claims also rendered predictions in this realm for the 1996
Term quite inaccurate. In Turner, Glickman, and Schenk, normally con-
servative Justices voted liberally, and normally liberal Justices voted con-
servatively. The scores of six of the nine Justices deviated in a statistically
significant manner from their prior mean scores. 65 The shifts were in both
liberal and conservative directions, with normally liberal Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Stevens shifting in a conservative direction and normally
conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas shifting in a liberal direction.
Justice O'Connor, who, as previously noted, occupies a swing position on
the Court, followed the liberal bloc in voting more conservatively this
Term. The voting patterns of the Chief Justice and Justice Breyer show a
near-perfect correlation, with an adjusted r2 statistic of 99%.
Table 6: Equal Protection
Data Table 6 and Chart 6 demonstrate conservative movement this
Term, compared to last Term's relatively liberal voting behavior.66 In the
"Majority All Cases" category, the Court voted for the equal protection
claim only 20% of the time, compared with 80% of the time during the
1995 Term. This conservative trend was also evidenced in the "Split Deci-
sion" category, with the Court voting for the claim only 33.3% of the time.
Thus, the scores this Term indicate a fairly steep decline in support for
equal protection claims. Only five cases involving such claims were ar-
gued this Term, however, and reliable conclusions are hard to draw from
such a small sample of cases.
Individual Justices also exhibited some rather dramatic shifts in vot-
ing behaviors. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not support an
Equal Protection claim in any case this Term. Justice Souter, in turn, only
voted for the claim 20% of the time, marking an all-time low for him.
65. The six judges were as follows: Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, O'Connor, Scalia, Stevens
and Thomas.
66. Case decided in favor of the equal protection claim: M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555
(1996). Cases decided against the equal protection claim: General Motors, 117 S. Ct. at 811;
Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2186; and Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
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Predicted voting behaviors involving equal protection claims were
markedly inaccurate, perhaps due to the small sampling of equal protection
cases appearing over the course of this Study. Because the Justices' scores
have varied so widely from Term to Term, very large deviations are re-
quired to register a statistically significant shift from historical means.
Only the Chief Justice and Justice Souter posted scores demonstrating such
a shift, a conservative one in both cases. Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and
Souter have voted identically in this category over the course of the Study
and, therefore, have perfectly correlated voting patterns, with an r2 statistic
of 100%.
Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights
Data Table 7 and Chart 7 show the Court voting more frequently in
favor of statutory civil rights claims this term.67 In the "Majority All
Cases" category, the Court accepted 57.1% of all the claims presented-
the second highest score since the inception of this Study. This liberal
movement is offset by an eight-point drop in the acceptance rate of statu-
tory claims in split decisions; the Court accepted the claims in this cate-
gory only 16.7% of the time, compared with a 25% acceptance rate last
Term. The overall liberal movement in Table 7 is reinforced by the 87.5%
acceptance of statutory claims in "Unanimous" cases.
Because the liberal movement in statutory civil rights claims results
largely from the outcomes of "Unanimous cases" (where ideology is osten-
sibly less relevant), such movement perhaps should not be overstated.
Nevertheless, the rankings of the individual Justices in Table 7 suggest that
the outcome may be significant since the top four positions are held by the
Court's most liberal Justices. Justice Souter, for example, leads the Court
in his support of statutory civil rights claims, voting for such claims 92.9%
of the time. Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg follow, each voting for
the claims more than three-fourths of the time. The Court's most conser-
vative Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas), by con-
trast, accept statutory claims only half the time. Interestingly, the four
67. Cases decided in favor of statutory civil rights claims: Lopez v. California, 117 S. Ct.
340 (1996); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997); Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Young v.
Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997); Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997); Richardson v.
McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997); and Foreman v. Dallas County, 117 S. Ct. 2357 (1997).
Cases decided against statutory civil rights: Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct.
1382 (1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.
Ct. 1584 (1997); McMillian v. Alabama, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct.
1925 (1997); and Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157.
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Justices with 50% scores this Term (the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Kennedy) also had identical 16.7% scores last Term.
The predictions regarding Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens
were relatively accurate, as the Chief Justice voted just 7 points less often
for the claims than his predicted behavior of 57%. Justice Stevens' be-
havior was also close to the predicted mark, as he voted just 7.5 points
more often for the claim than predicted. Justice Scalia, who voted for the
claim an uncharacteristic 50% of the time (his highest score in the last
eight Terms), was the least predictable Justice on statutory civil rights
claims. The scores of the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Stevens, and Thomas departed in a statistically significant manner from
their previous means. All shifted in a liberal direction.
Table 8. Jurisdiction
Data Table 8 and Chart 8 reveal no startling changes in the Court's
voting behavior in 1996.68 In the "Majority All Cases" category, the Court
only slightly decreased its support for federal jurisdiction, dropping about
five points from 57.1% to 52.2%. This change seems rather innocuous.
However, in 1996, the Court supported jurisdictional claims in "Split Deci-
sions" only 28.6% of the time-a 21-point drop from its 1995 support of
federal jurisdictional claims. Coupled with the four-point drop in "Unani-
mous" cases, this movement suggests a slightly conservative trend.
Individually, the most significant change in voting behavior is the
Chief Justice's nearly 14-point increase in his support of federal jurisdic-
tional claims. Indeed, except for the Chief Justice's movement, the top
(Justice Stevens) and bottom (Justices Thomas and Scalia) of Table 8 re-
main unchanged from last Term, with only slight variances in the order of
the remaining Justices.
Predicted voting behaviors on jurisdictional issues, accordingly, were
relatively accurate. Justice Stevens was again the most predictable, voting
for the exercise of federal jurisdiction only 9.4 points more often than his
68. Cases decided in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction: Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 417;
United States v. Jose, 117 S. Ct. 463 (1996); Caterpillar v. Lewis, 117 S. CL 467 (1996); Wal-
ters, 117 S. Ct. at 660; Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 796; General Motors, 117 S. CL at
811; United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997); Bennett, 117 S. CL at 1154; Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997); Suitim v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659
(1997); DeBuono, 117 S. Ct. at 1747; and Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997). Cases de-
cided against the exercise of jurisdiction: In Re Gaydos, 117 S. Ct. at 466; Adams v. Robertson,
117 S. CL 1028 (1997); Arizonans for Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1055; Harbor Tug & Barge
Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997); Arkansas v. Farm Credit Serv. of Cent. Arkansas, 117 S.
Ct. 1776 (1997); Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1800; Hughes Aircraft, 117 S. CL at 1871; Coeur d'
Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. at 2028; Lindh, 117 S. Ct. at 2059; Amchem Products Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); and Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2312.
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past behavior indicated. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the most unpredict-
able, voting for federal jurisdiction 25 points more often than prior behav-
ior suggested. Except for the Chief Justice, no Justice strayed from his or
her predicted behavior by more than 16.4 points. Perhaps the most notable
fact regarding the predictions was that they were all too conservative, with
every Justice voting more often to support a claim of jurisdiction than his
or her prior record foreshadowed.
No Justice's score varied to a statistically significant degree from its
prior mean in this category. Many correlations are apparent in the voting
patterns. The strongest is between Justices Kennedy and Breyer, with an r2
statistic of 99%.
Table 9: Federalism
Data Table 9 and Chart 9 demonstrate significant conservative con-
solidation on federalism issues.69 Although the "Split Decision" category
recorded only a slight increase in support of the state claims, rising from
62.5% to 63.2%, the "Majority All Cases" category recorded its second
highest score since the inception of this Study-rising from 51.9% to
68.3%. The "Unanimous" category's score likewise increased dramati-
cally, moving from 36.4% in 1995 to 72.7% this Term.
On an individual level, the Chief Justice led the conservative trend,
voting for the state 75.6% of the time. This marked a 23.7 point conserva-
tive increase from last Term. But, while the Chief took the top conserva-
tive spot on Table 9, Justice O'Connor evidenced the most significant
movement, climbing 26.3 points from last Tenn. Only the Court's two
most liberal Justices (Justices Stevens and Souter) voted for the state
69. Cases decided in favor of the states: California, 117 S. Ct. at 337; Robinette, 117 S. Ct.
at 417; Greene v. Georgia, 117 S. Ct. 578 (1996); Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 666; California Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997); Regents of Univ. of
California v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900 (1997); Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905 (1997); Arizonans for
Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1055; Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997); Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997); Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 1491; Lords Landing
Village Condominium Council v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731 (1997); McMillian v.
Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997); De Buono, 117 S. Ct. at 1747; Arkansas, 117 S. Ct. at
1776; Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1800; Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997); O'Dell, 117 S. Ct.
at 1969; Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); Idaho, 117 S. Ct. at 2028; Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2157; Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2293; and Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365
(1997). Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Lopez, 117 S. Ct. at 340; Caterpillar,
117 S. Ct. at 467; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996); Young v. Fordice, 117 S. Ct. 1228
(1997); Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997); Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 1491; Lambrix, 117 S.
Ct. at 1517; Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117
S. Ct. 1879 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 117 S. Ct. 1888 (1997); Richardson v. McKnight,
117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997); Foreman, 117 S. Ct. at 2357; Pounders, 117 S. Ct. at 2359.
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claims less than half of the time, and Justice Kennedy recorded his highest
score of the six most recent Terms. Thus, an overall conservative trend is
evidenced by the voting behavior of the individual Justices this Term.
Of all of the Tables, voting behaviors on federalism issues were the
most accurately predicted. The highest error recorded was for Justice
Kennedy. His score of 68.3% was 19.2 points more conservative than his
predicted score of 49.1%. The remaining Justices voted almost exactly as
predicted. Justice Scalia was the most predictable, with an error of less
than a point. Justice Stevens voted more conservatively than predicted by
only 2.4 points. Justice O'Connor voted more conservatively than pre-
dicted by 8.6 points, and the Chief Justice exceeded his anticipated be-
havior by 6.2 points.
The scores of the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Scalia all shifted in a statistically significant, conservative direction from
their previous means. The most notable correlation in voting patterns in
this category is between Justices Kennedy and Breyer, with an adjusted r2
statistic of 99%.
Table 10: Swing Votes
Data Table 10 and Chart 10 indicate voting scores for the sixteen
cases that were decided by a margin of one vote.70 The scores indicate an
equalization of "Conservative" and "Liberal" coalitions. The two coali-
tions' scores were the second closest in the history of the Study at only
12.6 points apart. The "Conservative Coalition" "out-swung" the "Liberal
Coalition", collecting the crucial fifth vote 56.3% of the time. The "Lib-
eral Coalition", however, was not far behind--controlling the outcome in
seven of the 16 closely divided cases decided this Term.
For the fourth year, Justice Kennedy is the Court's Most influential
swing voter, voting with the majority 81.3% of the time. Justice O'Connor
likewise retains her second place position, voting with the majority 75% of
the time. In fact, for the third Term in a row, the Justices in the top three
swing vote positions are the same: the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor. Moreover, the swing-vote majority was only able to gather
the crucial fifth vote in three of the 16 cases without the vote of Justice
Kennedy. Because he sided with the majority in 13 of the 16 swing vote
70. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Turner, 117 S. Ct. at 1174; Board
of County Comm'rs, 117 S. Ct. at 1382; McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1734; Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at
1925; O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1969; Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. CL 1997 (1997); Idaho, 117 S. Ct. at
2028; Kansas, 117 S. Ct. at 2072; Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2130; Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2186; and
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2365. Swing-vote cases reaching a liberal outcome: Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at
644; Camps Newfound/Owaloana Inc. v. Harrison, 117 S. Ct 1590 (1997); Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at
1754; Lindh, 117 S. Ct. at 2059; and Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2100.
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cases, it seems apparent that, in the clear majority of close cases, "as Jus-
tice Kennedy votes, so votes the Court." Justice Ginsburg continued in her
contrarian ways, swinging with the majority only 31.3% of the time.
The swing-vote tallies for the past eight Terms suggest that the Court
faces something of an ideological stand-off. The 1988 and 1989 Terms
were the last time that conservative coalitions possessed marked power
(deciding 76% and 64% of the swing-vote cases those years, respectively).
In 1990, power was almost evenly divided between conservative and lib-
eral coalitions, and in 1991, liberal coalitions held sway. Similarly, in
1994, liberal coalitions decided about 64% of the cases decided by a five-
member majority. Although conservative coalitions have controlled the
outcome of close cases in three of the past four Terms, conservative coali-
tions are prevailing less dramatically than they did in 1988 and 1989. In
short, while the current Court is conservative, the unsteady and apparently
diminishing power of conservative coalitions suggests that the Rehnquist
Court is unlikely to cut bold, new conservative ground in the near future.
V. Category Analysis
With data now collected from eleven Terms, we can begin to analyze
the effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and con-
servative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some categories
more clearly indicate the Court's collective and individual predilections
than others. Some, although tending to divide the Court into lib-
eral/conservative blocs, may "change polarity," depending on the specific
issues presented. For example, this Term's First Amendment scores show
Justices Scalia and Thomas at the top---a liberal position by this Study's
definitions, and a position not commonly occupied by these particular Jus-
tices. Conversely, Justice Breyer holds the bottom spot this Term, in con-
trast to second place last Term. Other categories, such as equal protection
claims, tend to be implicated in very few cases. This results in highly
volatile score movements from Term to Term because a single case may
account for many percentage points.
Factor analysis71 provides one method for evaluating the ability of a
particular test, a category in the case of this Study, to measure a character-
istic or factor. By applying this method, we have determined that a pri-
mary factor may be extracted from the Study's categories that accounts for
nearly 40% of the variance revealed by the data on Tables 1 through 9.
72
We interpret this factor as liberal/conservative bias because that is what
71. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
72. We employed a QMAX rotation to achieve this result. See infra note 91.
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this Study purports to measure. The categories load onto this primary fac-
tor as follows:
Category Factor 1











According to this ranking, the Statutory Civil Rights category appears
to be our best differentiator of liberal/conservative leanings, while equal
protection is our poorest. A look at tlie data seems to confirm this result.
As previously discussed, equal protection claims are relatively rare and
produce volatile results.73 In the Civil/Federal Party category, also a poor
differentiator, case scores tend to switch poles as executive administrations
change. Liberal administrations will bring different types of cases before
the Court than will conservative administrations and will garner the sup-
port of different Justices. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's average
score was 74% under Republican administrations, but has fallen to 64%
since President Clinton took office. On the other hand, Justice Stevens av-
eraged 48% under the Republicans and 67% under President Clinton.
74
First Amendment cases also tend toward pole swapping. If this Term's
free speech issues had concerned flag burning, for example, rather than
abortion clinic demonstrations and government regulation, the scores
might have been nearly reversed.75
Category analysis, in short, suggests that the most reliable indicator of
actual ideology is the data collected on Table 7 (statutory civil rights), with
Tables 3 (state criminal cases), 8 (jurisdiction), 9 (federalism) and 1 (state
civil actions) providing the next most reliable data. Tables 4 (federal
criminal cases), 5 (First Amendment), 2 (federal civil actions) and 6 (equal
protection) provide the least reliable information. To the extent that the
73. See supra Chart 6.
74. See supra Table 2.
75. See supra Table 5.
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foregoing analysis is accurate, and Table 7 indeed gives the most reliable
information regarding the ideological leanings of individual Justices and
the court as a whole, the liberal movement shown on that table may be
more notable than the generally uniform (and undramatic) conservative
data evidenced on the remaining Tables.
VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or conser-
vative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over time is
challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already discussed is
that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their validity. Another is
accounting for inconsistency in the nature of cases appealed to the Court
from one Term to the next and in the Court's selection of which questions
it will decide. With varying parameters such as these, is there any mean-
ingful way to quantify, analyze, and compare the Justices' inclinations?
One potentially useful method is frontier analysis,76 which focuses on the
Justices' relative scores rather than their absolute scores. Boundaries or
"frontiers" are defined by the highest and lowest scores in each category
and each combination of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative
to the established frontier, itself adjustable to reflect each category's im-
portance.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1 through 4 below. Two versions of each frontier
are presented. In Tables 1 and 2 we constrain the weights allocated to each
category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described above.7 7 In
other words, each Justice is allowed to "choose" the weights that produce
the highest frontier score for him or her, subject to the limitation that the
Criminal/State catagory can not receive more weight than the Statutory
Civil Rights category, Jurisdiction can not receive more weight than
Criminal/State, and so forth. Tables 3 and 4 apply no weighting con-
straints at all, allowing each Justice to "choose" those weights that present
him or her in the most conservative or liberal light possible. Each table
lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Those with a score of 100%
reach the frontier by employing the category weight distribution shown in
the category columns. Scores less than 100% indicate that the most con-
servative/liberal score the Justice could obtain with optimal weighting
places him or her the indicated percentage of the way toward the frontier.
In some cases, an optimal combination of weights may even place a Justice
76. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see Appendix B.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75 and Appendix B.
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beyond the frontier. This condition is known as "superefficiency" and is
noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of each Justice
over the course of this Study in graphical form. Because a black and white
line graph containing nine data series can be difficult to read, we have dis-
played lines for only Justice Rehnquist, who dominates the conservative
frontier during most Terms, and Justice Stevens, who usually dominates
the liberal frontier. Markers without lines represent the remaining Justices.
Near the bottom of each- chart is an indication of new Justices replacing
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are not
indicated, they contributed to frontier determination during Terms in which
they sat on the Court. Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of
frontier scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justices' relative positions
overall.
The Charts reveal several interesting trends. Frontier Chart 1 shows
Justice Thomas making a superefficient conservative "splash" during his
first Term on the Court, then settling in around the frontier thereafter.
Frontier Chart 2 shows clear and growing domination of the liberal frontier
by Justice Stevens. This chart also provides evidence that Justice Souter's
reputation as the "stealth justice" may be justified.7 8 Beginning his tenure
on the Court in 1990 with a liberal frontier score of just 53%, Justice
Souter subsequently registered scores of 74%, 79%, 88%, 96%, and 100%
prior to backing off to 85% in the 1996 Term.
Frontier Chart 3 shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas have all reached the conservative
frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the Chief Justice has never
dropped below it, i.e., he has demonstrated conservative super-efficiency
each Term. Frontier Chart 4 clearly displays Justice Stevens' super-
efficient liberal tendencies. In fact, he so dominates the liberal frontier
that only two other Justices, Breyer and Souter, have managed to touch the
frontier. Justice Ginsburg is alone in reaching neither the liberal nor the
conservative frontiers during her four Terms on the Court.
78. See, e.g., Souter's Recent Turn to Left Makes Him Justice to Watch on Supreme Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1993, at All. The article stated: "In his first term, he wrote so little he
was nicknamed the 'stealth justice." Last term, he was lumped into a trio of moderate conserva-
fives. Now, in the term just ended, Supreme Court Justice David Souter is the surprise of most
high-court prognosticators for displaying increasingly liberal tendencies." Id.
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Conclusion
The 1996 Term, overall, reflects consolidation-rather than expan-
sion-of the current Court's conservatism. Although the Court continues
to vote in a conservative manner on most of the Data Tables comprising
this Study, the Court's actions (with the possible exception of its atypical
and marked rejection of First Amendment claims) are neither dramatic nor
surprising. The surprisingly "conservative" failure of First Amendment
claims this Term, moreover, may well be due to cross-cutting ideological
issues in the decided cases-not to substantive rejection of liberal free
speech norms.79 Moreover, Data Table 2 (where the most politically lib-
eral members of the Court have taken the lead in supporting the federal
government) and Data Table 7 (where those same Justices have cast con-
sistently liberal votes in favor of statutory civil rights claims) suggest that
liberal forces on the Court are not quiescent. That reality is underscored
by Data Table 10, which shows, once again, that whichever ideological
wing catches Justice Kennedy obtains the right to decide the Nation's most
controversial cases. The ideology of the Rehnquist Court, in sum, is ma-
ture and ripe for change. The next replacements on the Court will either
energize the Court's extant, but somewhat quiescent, conservatism, or tip
the balance of power in favor of an already established liberal wing.
79. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1996 Term cases
decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded even if
accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are
included only if they are accompanied by a full opinion of the Court and
not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-four vote re-
sulting in affirmance without written opinion have been excluded. Both
signed and unsigned per curiam opinions are considered full opinions if
they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting
within any of these categories are not included in the database for any of
the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly un-
derstood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly identified
in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a problem of classifi-
cation. No cases in 1996 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of
criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if they do not
satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be the United States
government or one of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to a state
government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit against a government
official in a personal capacity is included if that official is represented by
government attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise
clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded
if governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a
state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with
only private parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and
2. A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are re-
solved by different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion. One
case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is also included
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more than once on the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues in
the category affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are re-
solved by different voting alignments. A case is not included on a table if
an issue raised by one of the litigants is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues poses
no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly identified in
the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, association, and free exer-
cise of religion are included. However, Establishment Clause cases are ex-
cluded since one party's claim of religious establishment is often made
against another party's claim of free exercise or some other individual
right, thus blurring the issue of individual rights.
The statutory civil rights issues included on Data Table 7 are limited
to those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handi-
cap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substan-
tive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue involves the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted is based on the
United States Constitution and the issue relates to that constitutional right.
The purpose of this exclusion is to preserve the distinction between con-
stitutional and non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, abstention,
equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions are ex-
cluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the Court
dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on its juris-
diction.
The federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and state or
local governments. Common examples of these issues are preemption, in-
tergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments as a limit on federal government action, and federal court
interference with state court activities (other than review of state court de-
cisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or interstate relationships, such
as those raised by the dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, are excluded from the Table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-three deci-
sions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that reverse a
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lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or four-two are
not included because a shift of one vote from the majority to the minority
position would still result in affirmance by a tie vote. A case is included
more than once in the table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting




This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme Court
voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and relationships
among the Justices' voting patterns. We analyze these characteristics both
for the Court as a whole and for individual Justices.80 The following sec-
tions explain the statistical methods employed in this Study and how test
results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Justice
voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category. Some cate-
gories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in coarser score incre-
ments.
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fit into an Auto Regressive Integrated Mov-
ing Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.81 This model is useful in cir-
cumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's score) is
to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with no other ex-
planatory yariables. AR]MA modeling is most easily explained by starting
in the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This refers to a differencing process which op-
erates in a manner similar to differentiation of a
continuous function in calculus. The goal is
simply to remove trend from the time series data
by subtracting each score in the time series from
the next score in the series. The resulting differ-
ences form a new time series. This operation
may be repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs
only one differencing operation.
80. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or precluded in
some instances due to insufficient data.
81. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical software
with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q) model, see
PETER KENNEDY, A GtIDETO ECONOMEmCS 248-49 (1992).
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Auto-Regression:
Moving Average:
Once the series has been made stationary, an
auto-regressive parameter may be determined.82
This parameter seeks to relate each data point in
the stationary series to the data point immedi-
ately preceding it through multiplication. That
is:
Xt = AXI
where X, is the value of the data series at point t,
A is the auto regressive parameter, and XI. is
the value of the data series point immediately
preceding X,. Because we are dealing with a se-
ries of data points, however, a single parameter
will almost never precisely produce the relation-
ship just described for all data point pairs. Some
error is inevitable. However, we therefore seek
to determine that parameter which produces the
least total error when applied to the entire se-
ries."
A second parameter is determined that relates
the value of each series element X, to the error
between the estimated value and the actual value
of the previous element X,.1.84 That is:
Xt = -Bx1,-
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The
value of this parameter is also optimized to
minimize its total error when applied to the se-
ries.
82. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to various
properties of the data series. Our data series produces the most the most accurate forecasts with
single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
83. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is chosen
such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
84. Although this operation may not seem as intuitive as the autoregression operation, it
may help to think of the error terms as "'shocks' that initially set the process in motion and con-
tinue to keep it in motion thereafter." JOHN C. HOFF, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BOX-JENKINs.
FORECASTING 50 (1983).
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Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,.-Bx,.1+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining
between the calculated and actual values of X.
This final equation is used to predict the score
for the following Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"85 to determine whether this Term's score
(X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean of all pre-
vious Terms' scores (XI). Essentially, we treat these two numbers as the
means of two independent samples drawn from the universe of all scores in
the category.8 6 We hypothesize that X1 is also the true mean of the popula-
tion pI, and we set up this hypothesis (the "null" hypothesis) and its corre-
sponding alternative hypothesis as follows:
H,: = 1 The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X2 does not signifi-
cantly shift p from its previous value on the real
number line. Therefore, the two samples are sta-
tistically equivalent.
Ha: 1t i X1 The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X2 significantly
shifts 1i from its previous value on the real num-
ber line. Therefore, the two samples are not sta-
tistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a certain
confidence interval, 7 by rejecting the null hypothesis.8  This is accom-
plished by calculating the following statistic:
85. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P.
MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also CRAIG AND
HOGG, supra note 42.
86. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling, small
samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to impose some
measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
87. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test X2 may
shift 1t in either a positive or negative direction, a = .025.
88. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is beyond the
scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error. For a complete
explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 85.
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Equation : t= -9
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (a) and
the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).89 If the absolute value
of t is greater than the table entry, H, is rejected, and we say that the Jus-
tice has shown a statistically significant change in voting behavior this
Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be mapped
over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) between the vot-
ing percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia for the Equal Pro-
tection category. The points all fall close to an upward sloping line. On
the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting percentages of the Chief
Justice and Justice Stevens show only a very weak, negative correlation
(RO0.0473). The points are widely scattered about a downward sloping
line. Statistically significant correlations between and among Justices'
Term-to-Term voting patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1 through
10. The first number in each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient.
The second number is an R2 statistic. 9° Notice that Justices, such as Justice
Breyer, for whom we have few data points, are especially likely to show
high Pearson coefficients, but low R2 statistics. The latter is a more reli-
able measure of the actual level of correlation.
89. k = the number of parameters being tested. Here, gI is the only hypothesized parameter,
sok= 1.
90. The r2 statistic is an estimate of p 2, the true measure of correlation between the depend-
ant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the tables is a result of
the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result..
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Equal Protection Cases
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The correlation measured is in the Term-to-Term movement of Jus-
tices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices does not mean that
they necessarily vote together often. It simply means that their scores tend
to move up and down together from one Term to another. Also note that
correlation in no way implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt to
identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using batteries of
tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly measure the
characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts to measure the
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Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing" their disposition of
certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using Minitab
software from Minitab, Inc. The factor loadings presented were obtained
by applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full description of the theory
and mathematics underlying factor analysis is beyond the scope of this ap-
pendix, but several books on the subject provide reasonably simple expla-
nations of this complex process. 91
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an example.
Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's greatest






Alan's agent would argue that the title should go to the best croquet
player, while Debbie's agent would argue that the best marbles player
should win. Betty's agent would argue that each sport should receive
equal weight. To see why, weight each of the scores above by 50% and
add each athlete's resulting scores together. Alan would score (9 x 0.5) +
(2 x 0.5) = 5.5. Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7. Chuck's score
would be 4.5, and Debbie's score would be 5.5. The situation is presented
graphically in the following figure:
91. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1990);
PAUL KLINE, AN ESSAY GUIDE TO FACTOR ANALYSIS (1994).
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A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting A, B,
and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond which no
athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights assigned to mar-
bles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of the frontier. Moreo-
ver, B can be said to be super-efficient to the extent it lies beyond the line
AD connecting the two points adjacent to it on the frontier. A and D are
also super-efficient to the extent they lie beyond lines (not shown) con-
necting B with the points at which the frontier meets each axis. C falls
short of the frontier regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and cro-
quet. However, an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C
"looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine which
Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, instead of two
dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis includes nine dimen-
sions (all Study categories except Swing Votes). Although human minds
have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions, computers can handle the re-
quired calculations with ease. We performed our analysis using Microsoft
Excel's solver feature. Although the formulas and procedures involved are
straightforward, a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this
appendix.*
e For more information on frontier analysis, see DONALD L. ADOLPHSON, MANAGER'S
TOOLKrr: MANAGERIAL SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS [to be published 1998].
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